Hofstra Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 1

Article 10

1975

Judges. By Donald Dale Jackson
The Honorable Jacob Mishler

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Recommended Citation
Mishler, The Honorable Jacob (1975) "Judges. By Donald Dale Jackson," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 10.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol3/iss1/10

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Mishler: Judges. By Donald Dale Jackson

BOOK REVIEWS
JUDGES.

By Donald Dale Jackson.* New York: Atheneum. 1974

Pp. xii, 431. $10.00.
Reviewed by the Honorable Jacob Mishler**
Judges is a potpourri of history, politics, current and old
news items and vignettes of state and federal judges. The author
is a news reporter and magazine writer. He surrounds the judicial
decisional process with an air of contrived mystery.' The author's
expressed purpose in writing the book is "to illuminate the character and quality of American Judges." 12 He crisscrossed the
country for source material (he lists some 27 pages of source
notes), and presumably read extensively in his search. He promises hair raising revelations as he pries into esoterica. The promises are not fulfilled. The book tells us little we didn't know-i. e.,
that judges are appointed or elected as a political reward or
through a personal relationship with a Governor, United States
Senator or the President of the United States; there are good
judges and bad judges; that the power of the judiciary is awesome; that the decisional process is greatly influenced by ethnic,
racial and religious background-and offers no solutions to the
problems it enumerates.
The author describes in some detail the various systems used
in selecting judges. Both the elective and the appointive systems
have brought incompetent judges as well as men and women of
extraordinary ability to the bench. Both methods find strong support in tradition, history and vested political interests. Other
plans are superficially analyzed. For example, the Colorado Merit
3
plan is described as follows:
The new plan established a nominating commission for
each of the state's twenty-two judicial districts and another for
appellate courts. Each commission is led by a non-voting Su* The author was a Time magazine writer, reporter and editor for several years and
is currently a contributing editor for New Times magazine.
**Chief Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York.
1. I can think of no class of society that is subject to more public examination and
criticism than judges. Judges' written decisions are found in thousands of volumes and
countless unpublished opinions. Their courtroom behavior is also the subject of close
scrutiny by the media and the general public.
2. P. vii.
3. P. 204.
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preme Court justice, and includes three attorneys (selected by
the chief justice, the attorney general, and the governor) and
four laymen named by the governor. In addition, the amendment created a nine-member Commission on Judicial Qualifications (five judges, two lawyers and two laymen) with authority
to recommend to the state Supreme Court that a judge be removed.
The governor must fill a vacancy with one of the names
submitted by the nominating commission within fifteen days.
Judges are appointed for two-year terms, then run on their record on a yes-no "retention ballot," without opposition. Those
at Greene's level [Judge Greene is a member of Colorado's highest trial court] are elected for six-year terms. As of 1972, 40
percent of Colorado's judges had reached office by this process.
There is no perfect plan for selecting judges. Both the elective method and the appointive method have obvious deficiencies. To me, the glaring defect in the Colorado Merit plan is the
probationary term of two years and the requirement that the
judge run on a "retainer ballot" for a term of six years. Few
competent lawyers with substantial practices would give up their
practices for such an unpredictable future on the bench. If I were
called upon to devise a system for selecting judges, I would borrow
the commission feature of the Colorado plan. I would insist on life
appointment by the Chief Executive after full and complete investigation and public hearing and confirmation by the legislative body. The prestige of judicial office coupled with the security
of life appointment would attract the finest legal talent available.
The public's interest could be safeguarded through a removal
procedure.
Other interesting problems and trends in our judicial system
are noted, i.e., the wasteful dual system in this country (federal
and state), the overlapping jurisdiction of our state courts, activism and traditionalism in the judicial process, and ascendancy of
Blacks to the judiciary in the South.
The writing is hurried, uneven and haphazard. A chapter
may start with a quotation from the classics, a survey, or a treatise, then meander through a personal history of a judge's elevation to the bench, sprinkled with pointless conversation and a
news story of an unrelated event. The author exercised poor judgment in the selection of material. I got the impression that he
used everything he gathered to give the book its bulk (398 pages)
plus 47 pages of preface, acknowledgments, source notes and
index.
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Book Reviews
The book contains many inaccuracies, canards and distortions. Some will be apparent to the average reader; many will go
unchallenged. I was privy to the events that occurred in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York. Two of them deserve mention here.
Jackson makes much of the late Judge George Rosling's display of anger during the well publicized skyjacking trial of Garrett Brock Trapnell. This lengthy trial, which eventually ended
in a hung jury, generated considerable interest in the news media
and in the general public. The public heard and viewed the skyjacking and witnessed the dramatic shoot-out between Trapnell
and the F.B.I. agents, disguised as a relief crew at John F. Kennedy Airport on January 29, 1972. Public interest was heightened
through news stories of Mr. Trapnell's past history of violent
crime and his prior success in the use of legal defenses based on
lack of mental capacity.' Mr. Trapnell interposed the same defense to the skyjacking. The Government claimed that Trapnell
had the mental capacity to both appreciate the criminality of his
conduct and conform his conduct to the requirements of the law,
and further that he had merely feigned insanity when faced with
criminal charges in the past.
From the date of Trapnell's arrest on January 29, 1972, to the
date of the commencement of the trial on December 11, 1972, the
court had to deal with an extraordinary number of pretrial motions.5 In this busy court 6 judges are assigned cases under the
individual assignment system. Cases are scheduled for trial six to
eight weeks in advance of the trial. The Trapnell trial time was
estimated to be about two weeks. It was a five week trial. The
evidentiary part of the trial was completed on January 10, 1973
and the case given to the jury on January 11, 1973. Disruption in
the trial schedule is something a judge deals with every day.
Every delay requires conferences with lawyers for the purpose of
rescheduling trial dates, conferences between lawyers and judges
of other courts to rearrange trial dates in those courts, and endless
telephone calls.
After the first day of deliberation, juror No. 4 wrote a letter
4. In layman's language, his defense of insanity had gained him many acquittals for
earlier criminal acts.
5. Five motions were for psychiatric examinations.
6. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York has one of
the most congested criminal calendars in the country.
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to Judge Rosling complaining that the other jurors were attempting to coerce a verdict. The court disclosed the letter to the lawyers'and the defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial. Judge
Rosling directed continued deliberation, charging the jurors on
their duty to confer with each other and cautioning the jurors
against coercing a verdict. The normal reaction of a busy judge
beset by the problems presented by a mistrial is one of helplessness and frustration, which deepens with the awareness of the
ever increasing backlog of cases demanding immediate trial.
Judge Rosling held court on Saturday, January 13, 1974. On
that day the Foreman reported to him that eleven jurors had
arrived at a verdict of guilty soon after the jurors started deliberating and that from the outset juror No. 4 sat in a corner mute,
and refused to discuss the case with the other jurors. I did not
witness the scene reported by the newspapers but I can well understand the irritation, and even anger, that led Judge Rosling to
utter the inappropriate statement. 7 He realized the dissenting
juror had been employed as a psychiatric social worker all her life.
It appeared to him that the juror came to the jury box with a fixed
notion about the case. Judge Rosling believed the juror had violated her oath to decide the case on the evidence. Mr. Jackson
saw nothing more than an angry, irascible judge. Mr. Jackson's
interest did not go beyond repeating the news report of that day.
He might have learned something of the deep emotional distress
that is experienced by a dedicated trial judge when he is faced
with a retrial after a mistrial. He might have recorded the feeling
of exasperation and frustration in the realization of wasted time
and money, the fleeting doubt as to the viability of the jury system. Judge Rosling would have conceded the inappropriateness
of his statement; he would have told Mr. Jackson of his surprise
at the press report. As it is written, Mr. Jackson's report of the
incident is superficial and uninstructive.
The other subject of which I have personal knowledge is repetition of a charge of a conflict of interest made against a judge of
this bench in the New York Daily News. The author reports that
the Second Circuit Judicial Council stated that "no action by the
Council is warranted." '8 The reader is left with the impression
7. Jackson reports that Judge Rosling "threatened to have the juror investigated by
FBI agents to 'see whether she was performing her jury functions or some other functions.'" P. 156.
8.P. 275.
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that the conflict of interest was established, but that the breach
was not serious enough for action by the Council, or worse yet,
that the Council merely protected a "member of the club." The
charge was baseless. A full explanation was made to the Daily
News reporter but not adequately reported in the newspaper. The
judge, having no forum in which to defend himself, voluntarily
made a full disclosure to the Chief Judge of the Circuit. The
information was available to the author through a telephone call.
Mr. Jackson again missed an opportunity to tell us something
about the character of American judges.
Chapter XV entitled "Portrait in Ermine" is by far the best
written part of the book. The focus on a single court-the Supreme Court-makes the subject manageable. Moreover, the
topic lends itself well to the purposes of the book. In tracing the
history of the Supreme Court, Jackson highlights many informative and often overlooked details. We have only had 100 Supreme
Court Justices in the history of the Court. The Supreme Court
under Washington was a six member Court, increased to seven
under Jefferson, and then to nine under Jackson. We may have
forgotten that Lincoln was given the opportunity to pack the
Supreme Court when Congress increased the number from seven
to ten. Lincoln appointed five Justices in three years. Mr. Jackson also reminds us that the Reconstruction Congress that sought
to remove Andrew Johnson curbed his appointive power by reducing the number of Justices to seven. The Court was increased to
its present size in 1869.
This chapter is flavored with incidents displaying the personality of some of our Justices. The author describes the behavior
of Justice James McReynolds as "a cantankerous Tennessean
who had been Wilson's Attorney General before he reached the
court in 1914."1
Mr. Justice Frankfurter described McReynolds as
"a hater.""0 Chief Justice Taft said of him that he was "selfish to
the last degree . . . fuller of prejudice than any man I have ever
known, and one who seemed to delight in making others uncomfortable."" The chapter makes easy reading and at times is exciting. The writing is marred by the incorporation of a description
of a visit the author made with Chief Justice Burger to the Maryland State Penitentiary in Baltimore. If this were deleted, Chapter XV might very well serve as a separately published monograph.
9. P. 336.

10. Id.
11. Id.
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By Sylvia A. Law.* New
Haven: Yale University Press. 1974. Pp. x, 246. $8.95.
BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG?

Reviewed by John L. Shurtleff*
When a book is prefaced, as is Blue Cross: What Went
Wrong?, with statements that its authors' have "produced scholarly analyses of major aspects of health services delivery"; 2 when
it includes 858 footnotes; when it identifies itself as the "collective effort of the Health Law Project of the University of Pennsylvania"; 3 and when it is published under the equally academic
auspices of the Yale University Press, one has a right to expect
that however critical its conclusions, it will state facts accurately
and will not omit important data even when they are contrary to
its thesis.
These standards of truth and probity this critique of the Blue
Cross system fails sadly to meet.
It makes many material misstatements of fact;4 it makes no
5
mention of significant events that run counter to its thesis; it
omits important and easily available data;6 it depicts as current,
circumstances which have long since changed and, worst of all,
* Ms. Law graduated from Antioch College in 1964 with a B.A. degree in philosophy
and received her J.D. degree from New York University School of Law in 1967. She was
the first staff director of the Health Law Project at the University of Pennsylvania and is
currently an assistant professor of law at New York University.
** Vice President, Secretary and Counsel, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New
York. A.B. Harvard College, 1944; L.L.B. Columbia University, 1948.
1. According to its Foreword, "[d]ozens of people contributed to this book," (Foreword at ix), but hereafter this review will, for convenience, refer to Ms. Sylvia Law who
is identified as the "Principal Author" and whose picture appears on the dust jacket.
2. Foreword at ix.
3. Id.
4. While some of the misstatements are noted hereafter, the complete catalog would
require too much space. They range from the unimportant, such as identifying Mr. Robert
Ball as Actuary of HEW (p.61), when actually he was Commissioner of Social Security in
HEW, to more serious errors such as stating that the Pennsylvania statute (Pennsylvania
is the Health Law Project's home state) "is silent on the review of reimbursement rates
to hospitals" (p.14), when actually PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §6124 (a) (Supp. 1974) provides
specifically for their approval by the state authorities.
In any event, to conserve space in this article I have not specifically cited all the pages
and lines where these errors in fact occur. A complete statement of the errors is on file in
the offices of the Hofstra Law Review.
5. See text accompanying notes 21-39 and 52-55 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 66-96 infra.
7. Neither in the text nor in any referenced footnote does the author mention that
the frontispiece quotation from Herman and Ann Somers was written sixteen years ago.
Thus, there is no way for the reader to put in time perspective the charge, to which the
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it repeatedly uses the technique of innuendo to mislead the
reader."
I use the word "sadly" for two reasons. First, a lot of work
and effort must have gone into the book's preparation, and some
of its background material, particularly that with regard to legislative history, is informative. The second source of my regret is
that I am in complete and wholehearted agreement with the
book's finding that health care financing should be "primarily
responsive and accountable to the public interest"9 and also with
its three basic themes and assumptions, which are: 0
1. "that the issues involved with the financing of health services are fundamentally ones of public and social policy;"
2. "that, in the absence of countervailing pressures, any organization or bureaucracy will attempt to maximize institutional
autonomy and stability, particularly financial stability;"
3. "the fundamental powerlessness of the consumer of health
and hospital care."
It is indeed depressing that so much labor on such worthy
themes has not blossomed into a useful study.
Within the context of those three themes, the book develops
its thesis of how Blue Cross "went wrong." In so doing, Ms. Law
maintains that:
author gives such a prominent place, as to the primary importance of "the needed increase
in public and consumer representation on its policy making bodies." Somers & Somers,
Private Health Insurance:Problems, Pressuresand Prospects, 46 Calif. L. Rev. 508, 557
(1958). The 1958 date of the California Law Review in which the Somers article appeared
is given by the author only in an entirely unconnected footnote on page 161.
8. See text accompanying notes 97-118 infra. See also text accompanying notes 5696 and 119-29 infra. The charge of intentional deception is as grave as it is difficult to
prove. Knowing men's minds is no simple task.
The scores of factual misstatements in the book are probably due mostly to oversight,
ignorance or carelessness rather than conscious intent. Surely, nobody in his or her right
mind would intentionally misstate a fact that rebuttal could effectively disprove except,
perhaps, a schemer anticipating that the gain outweighs the risk. It is for that reason that
purposeful deception is usually by way of concealment and/or innuendo. It is fully demonstrated here when the natural conclusions drawn by the reader from the text of the book
differ from the true state of facts on occasions too numerous for coincidence.
One other consideration: while Ms. Law is principal author, this work is, as noted, a
multiple effort. In the book, the loaded innuendoes seem to run in streaks. They alternate
with strata where recital of facts is only minimally adorned with hyperbole. These different styles could well signify different writers, and so the apportionment of censure becomes even more difficult, except perhaps under the doctrine of respondeatsuperior.
9. P. 2.
10. Pp. 3, 4.
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1. "[h]ospital representatives currently dominate Blue Cross
boards;""1
2. "the problem is [such] provider representatives are primarily responsible to hospitals rather than subscribers or the
public. It is unrealistic to expect that, as Blue Cross board members, hospital representatives will challenge hospital policies on
cost control, area planning or reorientation of services;" 2
3. "public planning is doomed to fail unless Blue Cross coordinates reimbursement with the public planning processes.
Blue Cross has, with few exceptions, failed on each of these
points; '"'3 "[t]he picture that emerges is one of total unaccountability." 4

This refrain-that there is a malign and cozy collusion
whereby a complacent hospital-dominated Blue Cross system
overpays hospitals with no controls imposed and few questions
asked-is repeated many times throughout the book.15 As an example, Ms. Law states that "[o]nly one instance can be found
in which a local Blue Cross Plan, or state official supervising such
plan, has attempted to limit hospital reimbursement to a reasonable level for allowable items."1 The instance cited is Pennsylvania.
I submit that Ms. Law's reiterated assertions that Blue Cross
is a creature of the hospitals 7 which makes no attempt to limit
reimbursements, coupled with her assertion that only Pennsylvania has made such attempts, is grossly misleading in view of
the significant limitations on such payments in a number of other
states" and the District of Columbia. These payment limitations
11. P. 26.
12. P. 27. See also pp. 29, 65.
13. P. 94.
14. P. 96.
15. Pp. 60, 61, 64, 65, 67-69, 89-93, 96.
16. P. 89.
17. Pp. 6, 10, 19, 26, 27, 97.
18. E.g., Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Rhode Island and West Virginia.
Massachusetts: For 1974, the Blue Cross Plan's interim payments to each hospital
cannot exceed 6.87% of the 1973 payments, adjusted for changes in occupancy. Final rates
will be established on the basis of increases in the general economy over 1973 derived from
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL ADNIsTRATIVE
TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL PAYROLLS classified into 19 different areas.
For over a decade prior to 1974, the Massachusetts Blue Cross Plan disallowed on
audit, individual hospital expenses in amounts averaging over a million dollars a year.
After such adjustments, each hospital's payment rates were based on the lower of allowable cost or charges. In 1973, this resulted in 43 out of 132 hospitals receiving payments at
rates lower than cost.
Michigan: Since 1958, the Blue Cross Plan has classified hospitals by size and geo-
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have been evidenced in a number of those jurisdictions by lawsuits between the Blue Cross Plan and hospitals with respect to
such limitations.1 9
I make this point with some vigor since for the last 15 years
as Secretary and Counsel of Greater New York's Blue Cross Plan
(sometimes known as Associated Hospital Service, hereinafter
referred to as "AHS"), I have spent a large portion of my time
contesting hospital lawsuits and proceedings demanding additional reimbursement.2" During that period, hospital representatives have called me a Communist, a Bolshevik, and a destroyer
of hospitals. After a bitter hearing on reimbursement rates, one
attorney for a particularly prestigious hospital asked me how I
could sleep at night after denying his client money needed to pay
for the care it rendered its patients. I do not recite these occasions
from any sense of grievance but merely to indicate that extremists, whether they want more money for hospitals or, like Ms.
Law, less money, are equally capable of empty epithets.
Let us turn from epithets to the record-cases where AHS
has fought to limit while hospitals strove to increase payment
rates.
graphical area and imposed limitations on these groups as to the amount which the
hospital's 'payment rate can increase from one year to the next, dependent on its average
per diem cost compared to the average for its peer group. Approximately 15-20 hospitals
each year have had their payment rates reduced below cost by this limitation.
Rhode Island: Since 1970, by Rhode Island statute, (R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §27-19-14
(Supp. 1973)) the state budget office has participated in line by line budget negotiations
between the Blue Cross Plan and its member hospitals. Payment rates derive from these
budgets to which the hospitals must correlate their expenditures or bear the consequences.
See notes 19-20 infra, for cases concerning payment limitations in the other noted jurisdictions.
19. Washington Hosp. Center v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., Civ. No. 24,061 (D.C.
Cir., filed March 13, 1974); Moundsville Gen. Hosp. v. West Virginia Hosp. Serv., Civ.
No. 9686 (Cir.Ct. W. Va. Oct. 6, 1970), petitionfor appeal denied, (Sup. Ct. of Appeals
June 7, 1971); Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp. Serv., Civ. No. 32630 (E.D. Mich. April
10, 1969). See also note 20 infra citing New York cases on point.
20. The situation in New York State seems a proper subject for discussion since Ms.
Law herself chose it as a primary arena. At the beginning of the book (pp. 14-16), she relies
heavily on three pages of quotations and conclusions drawn from two New York State
lawsuits; Thaler v. Stem, 44 Misc.2d 278, 253 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964)
and Procaccino v. Stewart, 25 N.Y.2d 301, 251 N.E.2d 802, 304 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1969). Both
of these New York cases were decided in favor of the Blue Cross Plan and will be examined
in more detail later (see text accompanying notes 75-84 infra). Since Ms. Law cites them
for the proposition that there is no examination "into the reasonableness and propriety of
payments made to member hospitals by [Blue Cross]" (p. 15), she has a responsibility
to her readers to at least refer to the many other proceedings in New York State where
the Blue Cross Plans or the regulatory authorities or both have vigorously contested
hospital demands for higher payment rates. See text accompanying notes 21-39 infra.
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I.
A.

REIMBURSEMENT TO HosPITALs

Development of Plan-Hospital controversies concerning
Reimbursement Methods in the GreaterNew York Area.

1. Prior to 1970
While the volume of controversy and litigation between the
Greater New York Blue Cross Plan and its member hospitals has
increased since the introduction of prospectively determined payment rates in 1970, the decade of the 1960's did see considerable
litigation, focused on limitations on payment, between the
Greater New York Blue Cross Plan and the hospitals in the metropolitan New York area. The results of the many court cases2
between hospitals and the Blue Cross Plan in this decade were
almost entirely supportive of the New York Blue Cross Plan's
efforts to limit or withhold payments to hospitals.
Of particular interest in this connection is Lefferts General
Hospital, Inc. v. Associated Hospital Service of New York. 2 At
page 89 of her book, Ms. Law criticizes the American Hospital
Association's "Principles of Payment" (which at page 66 she incorrectly attributes to the Blue Cross system), on the basis that
"allowable" items are not questioned. Particularly, Ms. Law asserts that "if a salary is 'allowable' for a particular position, it is
a reasonable cost whether the amount paid is $10,000 a year,
$50,000 a year or $200,000 a year."'
However, in the Lefferts case, Greater New York's Blue Cross
Plan did question and disallow $91,500 of salaries paid by Lefferts
General Hospital on the basis that the work done "was duplicative and not substantially productive,"2 4 and successfully defended this limitation in court. Again, in another case, the New
York Plan's refusal to include as "allowable," cost rent which it
21. Forest Hills Gen. Hosp. v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of New York, Civ. No. 52031965 (Sup. Ct. Queens County Mar. 21, 1968), aff'd, App. Div.2d_, 340 N.Y.S.2d
1013 (2d Dep't 1973); Mid Island Hosp. v. Wyman, 25 App. Div.2d 765, 269 N.Y.S.2d 259
(2d Dep't 1966); Bloom v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of New York, 45 Misc. 2d 208, 256
N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup.Ct. Kings County 1965), aff'd, 25 App.Div. 2d 818, 269 N.Y.S.2d 958
(2d Dep't 1966); Lefferts Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of New York, 23 App.
Div.2d 908, 258 N.Y.S.2d 854 (3d Dep't 1965); Bayview Gen. Hosp. v. Associated Hosp.
Serv. of New York, 45 Misc.2d 218, 256 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964);
Southside Hosp. v. Thacher, 11 App. Div.2d 670, 204 N.Y.S.2d 75, motion for leave to
reargue denied, 11 App. Div.2d 928, 210 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1st Dep't 1960).
22. 23 App. Div.2d 908, 258 N.Y.S.2d 854 (3d Dep't 1965).
23. P. 89.
24. 23 App. Div.2d 908, 910, 258 N.Y.S.2d 854, 856 (3d Dep't 1965).
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regarded as unreasonably large was upheld.25
While the New York Blue Cross Plan was successful in these
contests with hospitals in the courts, it had more difficulty with
various administrative proceedings brought by other hospitals
attacking the same and other limitations placed by the Blue
Cross Plan upon their payment rates. In a proceeding brought by
Madison Avenue Hospital with respect to 1965 payment rates,
the New York State Commissioner of Health determined that the
New York Blue Cross Plan had acted properly in disallowing
certain salaries, but that its imposition of a ceiling on the maximum allowable percentage increase in per diem expense made
the payment rate to the hospital inadequate. 6 The limitation on
the allowable percentage increase in per diem expense was again
stricken down in a proceeding by Parsons Hospital, also with
respect to its 1965 rates.-" In a proceeding by Medical Arts Sanatorium, Inc. with respect to 1963 and 1964 rates of payment, the
Commissioner of Health determined that the Blue Cross Plan had
improperly disallowed certain salary from reimbursable expense,
but that its application of limitations reducing the hospital's
reimbursement because of inefficiently low occupancy was appropriate. 2s In a proceeding by Pearl River Hospital with respect to
its 1965 payment rates, the Blue Cross Plan was ordered not to
disallo*€ certain salaries and further, not to apply a ceiling limitation which had been based on the average costs for a comparable
2
group of hospitals. 1
The imposition of a limitation based on the average costs of
similar hospitals was also called into question in a proceeding by
the Long Island Jewish Medical Center." Attacking the application of this "Group Maximum," and dissatisfied with the allowances which the Blue Cross Plan had made for its skills and
resources as a teaching center, the hospital demanded that no
25. Mid Island Hosp. v. Wyman, 25 App. Div.2d 765, 269 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d Dep't
1966).
26. In re Madison Avenue Hospital, order dated July 17, 1970. A copy of this order is
on file in the offices of the Hofstra Law Review. See p. 93 of the text of the book where
Ms. Law speaks favorably of "a fixed limit on allowable increases in reimbursement," the
type of control AHS sought to impose here.
27. In re Parsons Sanitarium, Inc., order signed July 17, 1970. A copy of this order is
on file in the offices of the Hofstra Law Review.
28. In re Medical Arts Sanatorium, Inc., order signed November 23, 1970. A copy of
this order is on file in the offices of the Hofstra Law Review.
29. In re Pearl River Corporation, order signed July 28, 1969. A copy of this order is
on file in the offices of the Hofstra Law Review.
30. In re Long Island Jewish Medical Center, order signed April 20, 1973. A copy of
this order is on file in the offices of the Hofstra Law Review.
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Group Maximum whatsoever be applied and that the Plan make
additional payments of $1,500,000 in connection with its payment
rate for years 1965 through 1969. In his decision, the hearing
officer found that the Blue Cross Plan had given insufficient recognition to the special circumstances at this institution and that
the hospital should be paid an additional $583,000-an amount
which the Health Department later reduced to $448,000.
2.

Hospitalpayment disputes- 1970 and after

With the 1970 introduction of prospectively determined
reimbursement rates in New York State, 31 there was a rapid increase in the tempo of hospital proceedings against this Blue
Cross Plan. On July 15, 1970, 22 members of the Greater New
York Hospital Association began the first proceedings under the
internal review provisions of the state-approved Blue Cross Prospective Reimbursement Method, 32 which proceedings were subsequently carried to the Department of Health. Since 1970, nine
different hospitals have started separate proceedings before the
Department of Health seeking sums aggregating in excess of
$15,000,000.3 This does not include more than 100 appeals that
did not reach or have not yet reached the Health Department,
34
involving sums in excess of $150,000,000.
In May and June of 1973, three lawsuits, two of them in
Supreme Court, New York County 35 and one of them in Federal
District Court 3 were commenced by a total of 55 hospitals attack31. Ms. Law misstates and apparently misunderstands this concept at pp. 105-06 of
the book. See text accompanying notes 40-51 infra.
32. These hospitals were: Beekman Downtown Hospital, Beth Israel Medical Center,
Brookdale Hospital, Brooklyn Hospital at the Brooklyn Cumberland Medical Center,
Community Hospital of Brooklyn, Hospital for Special Surgery, Jamaica Hospital, Jewish
Memorial Hospital, Long Island Jewish Medical Center, Memorial Hospital for Cancer
and Allied Diseases, Montefiore Hospital and Medical Center, Mount Sinai Hospital, New
Rochelle Hospital Medical Center, New York Infirmary, New York Medical CollegeFlower and Fifth Avenue Hospitals, New York University Medical Center, Richmond
Memorial Hospital, St. Luke's Hospital Center, South Nassau Communities Hospital,
Downstate Medical Center, Staten Island Hospital, Wyckoff Heights Hospital.
33. These hospitals are: Staten Island Hospital, Parsons Hospital, Mount Sinai Hospital, Presbyterian Hospital, Jewish Memorial Hospital, New York City Health and Hospital Corp., St. Luke's Hospital Center, St. Francis Hospital (Poughkeepsie), Mount Eden
General Hospital.
34. Data on these appeals are available on request.
35. Presbyterian Hosp. v. Ingraham, Misc.2d , 355 N.Y.S.2d 73 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1974); Benedictine Hosp. v. Ingraham, Index No. 9317/73 (Sup.Ct. N.Y.
County, petitionfiled May 18, 1973). Benedictine was joined in the Presbyteriandecision.
See text accompanying note 37 infra.
36. Society of New York Hosp. v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of New York, Civ. No. 2437
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ing the Prospective Reimbursement Method and its implementation by Greater New York's Blue Cross Plan in the light of the
economic environment produced by federal price controls for the
year 1973. These lawsuits sought a total increase in 1973 payment
rates in the approximate amount of $70,000,000.
In April of 1974, Justice Gellinoff of the New York Supreme
Court rendered his decision upholding the prospectively determined reimbursement method of the Plan but overturning one
aspect of its interaction with the federal price controls."1 Under
this court determination, hospitals were found to be entitled to
the lifting of Blue Cross Plan limitations in the amount of approximately $14,500,000.
In 1974, the Plan has already been served with papers in a
hospital class action concerning 1974 rates of payment;3 8 additionally, Presbyterian Hospital has commenced an action for
approximately $5,000,000 on the basis that the Blue Cross rates
of payment for 1970 and 1971, as confirmed by the decision of the
Health Department, were insufficient.3 9
All books have publication deadlines. The developments in
1974, perhaps even 1973, probably came too late for inclusion in
Ms. Law's book. They are only the most recent developments,
however, in a consistent pattern of hospital reaction to AHS payment limitations. What happened in 1973 and 1974 was a continuation of the prior decade with its scores of lawsuits and administrative appeal proceedings by hospitals of all types.
Ms. Law could easily have discovered these New York proceedings by the most elementary legal research or the simplest
inquiry. She instead chose utterly to ignore them and assert that
only in Pennsylvania do Blue Cross Plans attempt to limit hospital payments.
B.

New York State Hospital Cost Control Act.

While the book makes no mention of the reimbursement litigation between hospitals and Greater New York's Blue Cross
(S.D.N.Y., filed June 1, 1973). At the time this review went to press, this case was still
pending.
355 N.Y.S.2d 73 (Sup.Ct.
37. Presbyterian Hosp. v. Ingraham, - Misc.2d -,
N.Y. County 1974).
38. Mt. Sinai Hosp. v. Ingraham, (Sup.Ct. N.Y. County, petition served June 19,
1974). A copy of this petition is on file in the offices of the Hofstra Law Review.
39. Presbyterian Hosp. v. Ingraham, Index No. 12489/74 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County,
petition served July 30, 1974). A copy of this petition is on file in the offices of the Hofstra
Law Review.
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Plan, it does comment 0 on the New York State 1969 Cost Control
Law.' In so doing, it badly misstates and misconstrues the incentive reimbursement program established through prospectively
determined rates. First of all, it is not true that "it does not apply
to many of the most costly elements of hospital care" such as
"capital costs, costs of schools of nursing, costs of interns and
residents, and costs of ancillary services. 4 2 The truth of the matter is that items such as ancillary services are part of the predetermined rate within which the hospital must live. Thus Ms. Law's
subsequent statements "that as much as one-half of a hospital's
operating budget is excluded from controls" and "[a] hospital
could shift routine costs to ancillary services and be assured of
full reimbursement, plus the incentive guaranteed by the base
rate"4 3 are equally incorrect.
Ms. Law has become confused because the New York State
Medicaid reimbursement method, and that of the upstate Blue
Cross Plans, exempt ancillary services from the application of
limitations based on group averages. The feeling is that the justified differences in ancillary services, hospital by hospital, make
them less amenable to averaging than more routine services such
as bed, board and general nursing service. This approach may or
may not be correct, but it certainly does not exempt these services
from the prospectively determined rate and the consequent stimulus to the hospital not to spend more than the rate provides.
Furthermore, the Greater New York Blue Cross Plan has
availed itself of the Health Department Regulations44 and their
flexibility to apply the same limitations based on group averages
to ancillary services as it does to routine services.45 Thus Ms.
Law's comment is not only inaccurate generally but utterly inapplicable to the Greater New York Blue Cross Plan, and evidences her ignorance as to the operation of prospectively determined reimbursement in New York State.
It is significant that the groupings under which the averages
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Pp. 105-06.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §2807 (McKinney 1971).
P. 105.
Id.
10 N.Y.C.R.R. §86.2(b) (1970).

45. Associated Hospital Service of New York, Prospective Reimbursement Method,
Chapter 2. The applicable provision is contained in the Method originally certified by the

New York State Commissioner of Health and approved by the Superintendent of Insurance for reimbursement rates for the year 1970 and in each of the revised Methods approved for the succeeding years, copies of which are on file in the offices of the Hofstra
Law Review.
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and thus the limitations are established have been criticized not
only by Ms. Law,4" but also by the hospitals to which they apply
as being not too generous, but too restrictive. The Long Island
Jewish Medical Center and Pearl River proceedings" are only two
examples of Blue Cross-Hospital disputes arising from groupderived limitations which Greater New York's Blue Cross has
imposed on hospitals since 1960.
There is some merit in Ms. Law's criticisms that in the prospective reimbursement system, "the incentive provided is indiscriminate" and that it has not taken into account proper "allocation of resources"48 between hospitals, at least insofar as changes
in those allocations are concerned. However, while she charges
that "New York's program assures that hospitals that spend
most, and have spent most in the past, will receive most,"4 it is
just those hospitals which have been the most militant in bringing legal proceedings against Greater New York's Blue Cross on
the basis that their payment rates are inadequate, thus indicating
substantial Blue Cross limitations on these hospitals.
Ms. Law does admit that "[i]f the problem of rising hospital
costs were primarily one of efficiency or incompetence, cost incentives and penalties would be a helpful reform."5 However, she
characterizes the most expensive teaching hospitals as "often
highly structured, well organized, and staffed with efficient,
highly motivated and intelligent people" and argues that incentives do not help with these institutions' chief problem of being
"oriented toward parochial professional prestige.""1
I think that Ms. Law has made a good point in saying that
many cost escalation problems arise largely from competitive
rather than cooperative striving for excellence. Still, she should
realize that a hospital spending beyond its payment rates because
of such an endeavor is just as adversely affected by the monetary
loss as a hospital overspending because of inefficiency. Thus Ms.
Law underestimates the effectiveness of incentives.
However, prospectively determined reimbursement as an
incentive for hospitals to use available funds wisely and efficiently is a recent innovation. Refinements and improvements are
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

P. 106.
See notes 29, 30 supra.
P. 106.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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probably in order. Methods for setting rates of payment that will
recognize and stimulate effective delivery of a health care service
that is uniquely personal to each patient (and thus so difficult to
measure) can always profit from improvement. We certainly are
not ashamed of prospectively determined reimbursement thus
far, but we also welcome suggestions from Ms. Law or anyone else
who can point the way to specific and practical improvements.
C.

Reimbursement for care rendered to Medicare over Age 65
Beneficiaries.

Chapter IV of this book is entitled "Blue Cross and the Cost
of Hospital Services." Throughout it, Ms. Law vehemently criticizes the workings of the "reasonable cost" reimbursement plan
under Medicare and further maintains that Blue Cross is to be
held responsible for its inception. Actually, the basis of reimbursement was established in 1965 by Congress in the Medicare
Act 2 and by HEW in the Principles of Reimbursement and other
regulations issued by the Social Security Administration. 3 Despite the book's attempts to cast the Blue Cross Plans in the role
of the patron and progenitor of the alleged faults in the Medicare
reimbursement method, the fact is that they, and the New York
Plan in particular, pointed out and sought correction of flaws in
the reimbursement method.54
The Blue Cross role in Medicare reimbursement was not in
the design of the method but its implementation and application
to individual hospitals. With respect to implementation, which is
the Blue Cross Plans' function, decisions in 223 appeals by hospitals alleging inadequate reimbursement have been published
from 1968 to May, 1974. In these appeals, 70% of the decisions
supported the local Plan's position as to reimbursement, 22%
resulted in a partial recovery and only 8% were decided in favor
of the hospitals seeking added payment. 5 This is scarcely a record
which supports Ms. Law's characterization of incompetency and
complacency toward hospitals.
52. 42 U.S.C. §1395f (b) (1970).
53. 20 C.F.R. §405.401 et seq. (1974).
54. See text accompanying notes 66-96 infra.
55. At the outset, digests of these decisions were published in the Commerce Clearing
House Medicare and Medicaid Guide which subsequently discontinued, but more recently
has resumed, such publication. A record of these materials is available from the author
upon request.
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BLUE CROSS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, PARTICULARLY IN
YORK STATE, ARE NOT HOSPITAL-DOMINATED

NEW

There was a time when Blue Cross Plan boards were hospital
dominated; but that time is long past in most jurisdictions, including New York State. Ms. Law cites the New York statute as
one of the "enabling acts [which] require hospital
representatives on the board.

56

Reference to the statute indicates

that the requirement would be satisfied for Greater New York's
Plan by one hospital representative on its 44 man board, and
further that the statute is very specific in its limitation of hospital
and physician membership together on Blue Cross boards by requiring that "not more than one quarter of the directors. . . shall
be persons who are licensed to practice medicine . . . or who are

employees of a corporation organized for
trustees, directors 5' or
7
hospital purposes.

As to the extent to which board membership is monitored by
the New York State Insurance Department, Ms. Law errs in stating ". . .neither the BCA nor the Insurance Departments presently scrutinize board members for direct conflicts of interest. . . ."I' The fact is that the New York State statute specifically requires such scrutiny. Compliance with the provisions of

the law with respect to possible conflict of interest "shall be under
the supervision of the [S]uperintendent [of Insurance]."" The

statute further directs that not more than ten days after the election of a director, the Superintendent shall be furnished in writing "the name and address of the person so elected; whether such
person is. . .qualified to serve under the provisions of this subdivision; and a biographical statement concerning such person.""
Naturally, the New York State Blue Cross Plans comply with
both the requirements that board membership be submitted for
Insurance Department scrutiny and that representatives of subscribers and the general public must make up 75% or more of Plan
board membership. As a matter of fact, since its consolidation
with the local Blue Shield Plan on June 1, 1974, the Greater New
York Plan has had only five hospital representatives serving on
its 44-man board. 1
56. P. 26 citing N.Y. INs. LAW §250.1-a (McKinney Supp. 1973).
57. N.Y. INs. LAW §250.1-a (McKinney Supp. 1973).

58. P. 30. "BCA" stands for the national Blue Cross Association.
59. N.Y. INs. LAw § 250.1-a (McKinney Supp. 1973).

60. Id.
61. Bylaws of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York, effective June 1, 1974
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Aside from Ms. Law's errors as to New York State law, her
charges of current hospital domination of Blue Cross boards of
directors are not in accord with recent national statistics. 2 Nor
does she acknowledge that, "the needed increase in public and
consumer representation on its [Blue Cross'] policy-making bodies," which Herman and Anne Somers called for sixteen years
ago, has been taking place. 3 Her only recognition of change is in
footnote 150 where she characterizes as "a slight decrease" a decline of 13% in the proportion of hospital and doctor representatives from 1945 to 1969. The book is silent as to a further decrease
of 17% in provider representation from 1969 to 1973, and the fact
that by 1973 hospital representation on Blue Cross boards of
directors across the country had fallen to 29%, even when one
64
includes hospital trustees.
The characterization of hospital trustees (as well as full-time
hospital administrators) as hospital representatives raises an interesting point as to Ms. Law's charge that "[i]t is unrealistic
to expect" that such representatives will "challenge hospital policies on cost control." 5 The fact is that hospital trustees often
have as their full-time jobs employment by companies which
spend millions of dollars on Blue Cross Plan premiums and therefore have millions of dollars at stake in controlling hospital costs.
In such instances, the Blue Cross board member will have at least
as much concern for his employer, whose interest is in keeping
hospital payments down, as for the hospital of which he is a
trustee. In any event, such a board member would have the benefit of viewing the problem from both points of view, a position
that helps promote perspective.
following Hearingon ConsolidationBefore the New York State Dep't of Insurance (May
13, 1974). A copy is on file in the offices of the Hofstra Law Review.
62. A Plan by Plan analysis of representation on Blue Cross Plan Boards as of
December 31, 1973 is on file at the offices of the Hofstra Law Review.
63. Somers & Somers, PrivateHealth Insurance:Problems, Pressuresand Prospects,
46 CALIF. L. REV. 508, 555, 557 (1958). See note 7 supra.
64. Hospital and medical representation of 72% in 1945 had declined to 59% in 1969
and 42% in 1973. On a basis relative to the number of hospital and doctor representatives,
these represent declines of 18.1% and 28.3%, respectively.
Further, the percentage of hospital and medical representatives is even lower if it is
related to the number of subscribers covered. The figures given above related to total
number of directors without reference to the size of the Plans where they serve. On the
average, it is the smaller Plans which have a higher percentage of hospital and medical
representatives and the larger Plans which have a lower percentage of hospital and medical representation on the board. Thus, public and subscriber control is the strongest where
it counts the most-in the larger plans with the most subscribers covered.
65. P. 27.
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One important point that Ms. Law rightly makes is the overriding necessity that Blue Cross Plan boards be responsible to,
and continually sensitive to the needs of, subscribers and the
public. Some of the better passages in the book are the recitations
in Chapter V of the unpleasantness and suffering which can occur
when human needs run afoul of rigid, albeit well-intentioned,
rules and regulations. While the book still attributes to Blue
Cross Plans responsibility not only for their own acts or decisions
but also for decisions over which they have no control, the points
it makes as to the conflict between tender loving care on the one
hand and enforcement of good utilization practices on the other
are valid and well presented.
Nobody can do a perfect job in resolving such paradoxes, but
this is all the more reason that less than optimum performance
in service to the subscriber should be identified, examined and
corrected.
Ill.

SUPERVISION BY STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

A.

State Supervision.

In particularizing its charges as to "the massive failure of the
public regulatory agencies to regulate either Blue Cross or the
hospitals,"6 the book reserves its most scathing comments for the
New York State Insurance Department. When it states that the
New York Department "has done a lackadaisical job regulating
Blue Cross, ' 6 7 the reader is likely to conclude that it is referring
to New York in the statement on the same page that in "the
majority of states there remains no opportunity for public participation in the rate making process." 8
The fact is that the New York State Insurance Department
has held scores of public hearings on the non-profit plans in the
State, eleven of them covering a total of sixteen days on the
Greater New York Plan alone. 9 At these hearings, many
hundreds of witnesses have had the opportunity to comment on
the Blue Cross Plan program and performance.
As to other areas of regulation, while commercial insurance
companies need only file their contracts, certificates, riders, en66. P. 4.
67. P. 18.
68. Id.

69. The 11 hearings took place on the dates indicated: November 19, 1957; June 2.3,
1958; May 21, 1959; June 13-15, 1960; April 9-10, 1964; April 5, April 13, 1965; August 4,
1969; February 4, 1971; March 6, 1972; February 5, 1973; May 13, 1974.
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dorsements and application cards with the Insurance Department, the New York statute is very explicit as to the need for
Insurance Department approval "of the contract or certificate
and all applications, riders and endorsements as conforming to
section two hundred fifty-three ....
"70 Section 253 of the Insurance Law also goes into considerable detail as to the required
provisions of the contract, 71 and the Minimum Standards Regulations of the New York State Insurance Department cover exhaustively the benefits which hospital and medical coverage contracts
must provide. 2
The Minimum Standards Regulations are only a part of the
regulations7 3 which the New York State Superintendent of Insurance has issued over the past few years with hundreds of pages
establishing minimum benefit standards, claims practice requirements and other safeguards for the purchaser of health insurance.
In its detailed supervision, the New York State Insurance Department reflects a similar intensity of interest on the part of the New
York State Legislature, which since 1958 has enacted 52 chapter
amendments to Article IX-c of the Insurance Law which governs
74
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans.
This brings us to the two New York cases which Ms. Law
cites as being brought by "private citizens and city officials" and
providing "insight into regulatory attitudes."75
The first of these,76 which AHS won, was brought in 1964 by
New York State Senator Seymour Thaler. The allegations to
which Ms. Law refers arose out of the certified financial statements which the Greater New York Plan had been requiring, and
the audits which it had been conducting, of its member hospitals
since 1960. By virtue of those audits and the limitations which
had been incorporated in the 1960 Reimbursement Method, a
number of hospital costs actually incurred were disallowed and
70. N.Y. INs. LAw §255.1 (McKinney 1966).
71. N.Y. INs. LAW §253 (McKinney 1966), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1973).
72. 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § §52.1 et seq. (1972).
73. 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § §52.1-52.90, 215 et seq. (1973).
74. L. 1958, chs. 943-46; L. 1960, chs. 487, 517, 819, 928; L. 1961, chs. 361, 371, 483;
L. 1962, chs. 125, 176, 310, 610, 849; L. 1963, chs. 139, 638, 718, 742, 743, 745; L. 1964,
chs. 54, 65, 408; L. 1965, chs. 137, 202, 388, 719, 795, 845, 1004, 1026; L. 1966, chs. 893,
909; L. 1967, chs. 492, 514; L. 1968, chs. 632, 779, 862; L. 1969, chs. 765, 832; L. 1970, chs.
377, 571, 572; L. 1971, chs. 899, 982, 1139, 1211; L. 1972, ch. 918; L. 1973, ehs. 101, 328.
75. Pp. 14-16. Procaccino v. Stewart, 25 N.Y.2d 301, 251 N.E.2d 802, 304 N.Y.S.2d
433 (1969); Thaler v. Stem, 44 Misc.2d 278, 253 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1964).
76. Thaler v. Stem, 44 Misc.2d 278, 253 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
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payment rates to hospitals reduced in amounts of several million
dollars each year.77 In almost all instances, the disallowances involved not questions of impropriety but only problems as to
whether the costs were properly allocable to services rendered to
Blue Cross subscribers. The Reimbursement Method limitations
(mostly based on group averages) reduced many payments even
below the amounts of properly allocable costs.
To these endeavors to safeguard subscriber funds, first Senator Thaler, and now Ms. Law, have ascribed the most sinister
motives. The Blue Cross Plan was, in effect, accused of losing the
money which actually it had saved! To excoriate a Blue Cross
Plan for its method of recovering money instead of applauding its
success in reducing the payments is scarcely calculated to motivate good Plan performance in this regard.
The 1969 lawsuit7" which Ms. Law cites in footnote 87 was
really two proceedings79 brought separately (though almost simultaneously) by the two chief candidates competing in the 1969
mayoral election, both of whom made certain that their endeavors did not go unnoticed in the news media. Both petitioners
pressed their causes vigorously before the second Tuesday in November, asserting that any rate increase should await an opportunity to review the reasonableness of the hospital reimbursement
schedules" which would be forthcoming by 1970 under the new
Cost Control Law. Neither petitioner, however, evinced the
slightest interest in these schedules when they did appear.
As to the merit of the two proceedings, the Court of Appeals,
in upholding the subscriber rate increase, noted that the hospital
payment schedules would not "be available until some time in
1970,"' and the rate increase was necessary to avert Plan insolvency until such time as a determination could be made as to the
effect of the new law upon hospital rates and the consequent
impact upon subscribers.
The extent to which Ms. Law belittles the "expense and
77. Id.
78. Procaccino v. Stewart, 60 Misc.2d 551, 303 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County),
rev'd, 32 App. Div.2d 486, 304 N.Y.S.2d 55 (lst Dep't), a/I'd, 25 N.Y.2d 301, 251 N.E.2d
802, 304 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1969).
79. The second proceeding was City of New York v. Stewart. It was later consolidated
with Procaccino v. Stewart, Index No. 41709/69 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1969)..
80. P. 16, Procaccino v. Stewart, 60 Misc.2d 551, 303 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County), rev'd, 32 App. Div.2d 486, 304 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1st Dep't), afI'd, 25 N.Y.2d 301, 251
N.E.2d 802, 304 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1969).
81. Procaccino v. Stewart, 25 N.Y.2d 301, 306, 251 N.E.2d 802, 804-04, 304 N.Y.S.2d
433, 435 (1969).
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inconvenience" 2 to Blue Cross and its subscribers of a two-phase
subscriber rate adjustment emphasizes her lack of understanding
that it is the subscribers, not just the Plan, who are inconvenienced and must pay the expense.
Before leaving the subject of the degree to which the New
York State Blue Cross Plans and the state regulatory authorities
seek to control and limit hospital costs, it should be noted that
sometimes their efforts in this regard are badly hampered by
forces beyond their control. For instance, in 1974 the State Legislature passed a bill requiring third party payors to support each
hospital's losses on ambulatory care. 3 The impact of this law falls
almost entirely on the Blue Cross Plans since it cannot be applied
to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement unless federal statutes
and regulations are amended. As originally passed in April, 1974
by both houses of the State Legislature, it made no allowances
for how well the hospital might be doing in other phases of its
operations. Fortunately, it was revised by a Chapter amendment84 to offset net income from inpatient services against these
ambulatory care losses. Even so, this Act of the Legislature will
cost the Greater New York Blue Cross Plan and its subscribers
about $7,000,000 in increased payment rates for the year 1975.
B.

Federalsupervision and programs

Before addressing the Medicare program for the aged, one
comment on the Federal Employees Program is in order. The
book deplores, although recognizing as "probably inevitable," the
adoption of experience rating. 5 Since the Blue Cross system has
"abandoned its commitment to community rating" whereby "low
risk customers should subsidize the cost of the higher risk
groups," the author questions "whether Blue Cross deserves its
86
favored status under state and federal law."
82. P. 16. The extent to which Blue Cross seeks to minimize these administrative
expenses so that more money will be available for benefits is shown by the testimony of
Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner Herbert Denenberg (see text accompanying notes
110-17 infra) before the Senate Judiciary Anti-trust Subcommittee:
Because of greater efficiencies and because of subsidies from group plans, the
individual coverage written by Blue Cross may return even more than 97.3% in
benefits.
Hearings on Commercial Health and Accident Insurance Industry Before the Subcomm.
on Anti-trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1, at 396 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings].
83. N.Y. Pus. HALTH LAW §2807.4, L. 1974, ch. 1061, as amended, L. 1974, ch. 1062.
84. N.Y. PuB. HALT LAW §2807.4, L. 1974, ch. 1062.
85. P. 12.
86. Pp. 12-13.
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Ms. Law ignores the fact that there are still community rated
groups and that they are being subsidized by the low risk experience rated groups. She herself proves this, although she does not
put it that way. When she inveighs against the rates charged for
the Federal Employees Program she characterizes them as "profits" eleven times in three pages" and also as an "enormous gift
to Blue Cross/Blue Shield." u And how does a nonprofit Plan use
these "profits" and this "enormous gift"? That is right. They are
used to support the high risk community-rated groups in just
such a fashion as the book had previously eulogized!89
Now for Medicare. The author makes the astounding statement that "the federal Social Security Administration has no
means of monitoring plan performance"" as far as Medicare is
concerned. The fact is that the Bureau of Health Insurance,
through the Social Security Administration, conducts detailed
and exhaustive surveys of individual Plan performance. Ironically, it is the author who demonstrates how erroneous are her
charges of federal inattention by her references to "SSA study,"
"Contract Performance Review,"'" Annual Contract Reevaluation Reports,9" studies and audits by the General Accounting
Office,9 3 and by the HEW Audit Agency and CSC audit."
Nationwide in 1973, the Blue Cross system was examined and
tested in approximately 600 public audits. 8
The most recent such survey of the New York Plan, available
for examination by anyone so desiring, covered 26 pages and rated
the Plan's performance "satisfactory" in all eight areas. This
audit took approximately one man-year of federal auditors' time.
Other audits of the Greater New York Plan by federal agencies
for the Federal Employees Program, the General Accounting
Office and others totalled another man-year.
The New York State regulatory authorities spend an average
of three to four man-years each year on the triennial examinations, the audits in connection with subscriber increases and
other monitoring functions.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Pp. 54-56.
P. 56.
P. 12.
P. 23.
Pp. 95-96.
P. 46.
Pp. 53, 96.
P. 47.
P. 53.
Data on these figures are available from the author upon request.
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IV. THE BOOK'S TECHNIQUES OF INNUENDO AND CONCEALMENT
Whether criticisms transgress the boundaries of propriety
and good taste is a question of flavor and personal preference
which each reader must determine for himself. However, the
techniques of innuendo can be identified and demonstrated, although it is often tedious and time-consuming to do so. For that
reason, this review will limit itself to a few obvious examples.
Blue Cross: What Went Wrong? offers the surmise that
"[N]o one would be the wiser if a plan were to offer favorable
group rates based not on experience but on political influence,
representation on the plan board, or other extraneous factors.""7
So it states; no example is offered. Then, on the next page, after
charging lack of regulatory concern about conflict of interest," it
argues that such concern "would do much to curb the more flagrant abuses of Blue Cross power.""9
No accusation has in fact been made. No charge has been
explicitly levelled. However, the reader has definitely been left
with the impression of widespread wrongdoing in this respect.
Again Ms. Law uses the "would be" technique to promote
the inference that "it would be natural to expect that

. . .

costs

programs."'' 9

The anonymous
would be loaded onto the public
observer of these two examples is joined by the unidentified malefactor in the allegation that "[t]hose institutions with some accounting sophistication or with a fiscal intermediary willing to
assure the largest possible public reimbursement are provided
large opportunities for loading costs onto the publicly financed
programs."'' 0
As a matter of fact, the book's style of anonymous attribution
is set at the very outset on page 1 when, without citation, it states
that "it is widely acknowledged that the American health care
crisis is primarily one of organization, administration, and accountability."
Equally insidious is concealment by way of failure to give
credit where credit is due. The book states with reference to Medicare reimbursement that "[s]ome more conscientious intermediaries questioned whether hospitals that were able to utilize the
97. P. 29 (emphasis added).
98. This is inaccurate. See text accompanying notes 61-82 supra.
99. P. 30. When the book cannot specify some alleged misdeed, it turns often to the
phrase "flagrant abuses."
100. P. 74.
101. P. 88.
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departmental method should be allowed to claim more lucrative
reimbursement under the combination method."'' 2 Knowing that
Greater New York's Blue Cross Plan was one of those "conscientious intermediaries," I was slightly sorrowful that the text did
not so identify it but turned with anticipation to footnote 479
which was given to support the above statement. In its entirety
03
that footnote reads:
In 1967 one intermediary wrote to BCA showing that a hospital
would receive additional reimbursement of about $528,000 annually through the use of the combination method. The intermediary concluded that, "Because there is an apparent loophole
in the Medicare method of reimbursement this matter is being
called to your attention for whatever action you might wish to
take." GAO Report to the Congress, supra n. 471, at page 23.
It was Mr. J. C. Ingram of the Greater New York Blue Cross Plan
who reported this loophole in the Medicare method of reimbursement, but the book omits to so state.
When Mr. Ingram again attacked the flaws in the Medicare
reimbursement method in an article in Hospitals,Journalof the
American Hospital Association entitled "The Case against
RCC,"' 14 the book did not acknowledge this and instead accused
AHS of having "disseminated information on techniques of cost
loading."'' 0 This charge by Ms. Law is just as if one accused Ms.
Law of having "disseminated information on techniques" for the
Blue Cross system to "go wrong" because her book describes,
while it attacks, asserted wrongful acts on the part of Blue Cross.
Another sample of insincerity on the author's part involves
the timing of Medicare payments to hospitals. It criticized the
Principles of Reimbursement for "permitting hospitals to be paid
one month in advance for services to be rendered to Medicare
beneficiaries"; 0 8 it charges Blue Cross with failure because
"[u]nder Medicare, interim payments are made, 'on the most
expeditious basis administratively feasible . . ',;101and it expresses outrage that "hospitals are paid in advance."'' Further
on its criticism is the complete opposite, namely, that "Blue
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

P. 85.
P. 203 n. 479.
Ingram, The Case Against RCC, 41 HOSPITALS 38, April 16, 1967.
P. 81.
P. 64.
P. 94.
P. 96.
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Cross has paid hospitals more for Medicare and Medicaid Services but paid more slowly and inefficiently."''
The last example I will give of the book's penchant for misleading the reader concerns former Insurance Commissioner Herbert Denenberg of Pennsylvania. Ms. Law is vociferous and consistent in her praise of the Pennsylvania Insurance Department
under Dr. Denenberg's leadership. She states it "is an outstanding example" of a department which has instituted "measures for
the protection of the subscriber by taking a more rigorous, adversary attitude toward Blue Cross"'1 ' and that it "has been
uniquely effective in regulating costs and supervising Blue Cross
operations.""' Linked with Ms. Law's praises for Dr. Denenberg
are her citations of Denenberg as an authority to demonstrate
Blue Cross Plan failure. For instance, she notes that in 1971 - 1972
"Insurance Commissioner Herbert Denenberg criticized the Plan
for failure to hold down hospital costs"" 2 and again that "Pennsylvania's Insurance Commissioner Herbert Denenberg noted
that [e]vidence at the Blue Cross hearing indicated hospitals
may buy . . . at many times the cost of identical equipment
through conventional channels.""'
Ms. Law completely neglects to note the many words of
praise that Dr. Denenberg has had for the Blue Cross system. For
instance, early in 1972 he stated "the public should not lose sight
of the fact that compared to the commercial insurance industry,
Blue Cross is an angel of mercy.""' Again, in his testimony before
the Senate Judiciary Anti-Trust Subcommittee on May 11, 1972,
Commissioner Denenberg singled the Blue Cross system out for
particular praise, noting its efforts in attempting "to serve the
entire community, '"" 5 and further suggesting that "the public
would be better served if commericial insurers were immediately
109. P. 102 (emphasis added).
110. P. 16.
111. P. 18. See also pp.98-100, 112, 113.
112. P. 28.
113. Pp. 89-90. See also pp. 14, 16-17, 98, 112.
114. McFuuAN, Denenberg Uses Travelers-Blue Cross Decision to Blast Private
Insurers,THE NAT'L UrNERwmTER, Jan. 22, 1972, at 1, 4. In the same article Dr. Denenberg
is quoted as saying that:
in terms of the huge segments of the community it insures, the type of people it
insures, the contracts it writes and in terms of sums paid out in benefits which
represent 95 cents out of every dollar taken in, there is no substitute for Blue
Cross.
Id. at 4.
115. 1972 Hearings, supra note 82, at 397.
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removed from the market for individual coverage, leaving Blue
Cross and Blue Shield and similar organizations with a monopoly.""' In the November 13, 1972 issue of Moneysworth, Dr. Denenberg is quoted as saying that "with the quality and efficiency
of coverage offered in the health plans of the non-profit organizations, he has no quibble. The Blue Cross system pays back in
benefits an average of 97 cents for every premium dollar it takes
in ....
Finally, since Ms. Law devoted so much of her energy to
attacking the performance of the Blue Cross system under the
Federal Employees Program and Medicare, it is worth noting
what Commissioner Denenberg has to say in this regard. In his
appearance before the Senate Subcommittee on May 11, 1972 he
testified that Congress should "consider [giving] greater incentives and responsibilites to those who show promise of performance," and thus should "consider giving greater responsibility for
the Federal employees' health benefits program . . . [and] for
the administration of medicare and medicaid . . . to approved

Blue Cross Plans rather than commercial health insurance companies."'1 Not one of these words of praise for Blue Cross by Dr.
Denenberg are mentioned by Ms. Law.
These examples of the book's techniques and tactics, together with the omissions and inaccuracies described at earlier
points, do more than cast doubt upon the credibility of any of its
assertions. They also impugn its integrity. The book is not bad
merely because it is partisan. Many good books are partisan, for
it is a virtue to be incensed at selfishness and outraged at injustice. Nor need there be balance and perspective in every writing.
One cannot expect Demosthenes to point out the good qualities
of Philip of Macedon or Shakespeare those of Richard III or Joan
of Arc. We are not surprised when Charles Dickens, Sinclair
Lewis, or A. J. Cronin depict the legal profession, the American
businessman, organized medicine or hypocritical evangelism with
emphasis on the warts and very scanty praise.
However, the license that is permitted to polemics, poetry
and fiction does not extend to works of scholarship. Of course they
can be partisan in their arguments and conclusions, for many of
the wrongs that bedevil the world can only be righted through
116.
117.
13, 1972,
118.

Id. at 393.
The Consumer Newsletter, The Ralph Nader of Insurance, MONEYswoRTH, Nov.
at 2.
1972 Hearings, supra note 82, at 401.
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careful study and scholarship. However, the work of scholarship
is accountable to its readers to present the relevant facts and
present them accurately. If, through some rationalization that
the ends justify the means, it permits bias to becloud its veracity,
it does the cause of truth and clear thinking a double disservice.
First, it misinforms and misleads the reader. Worse than that, on
the larger scale, its untruths and the need to refute them lead the
reader to mistrust all studies and analyses as self serving and
untrustworthy.
The world's problems are not simple. To solve them will
require clear thinking and a dependable data base. Any treatise
which trespasses against truth cripples the credibility of all scholarship, the good as well as the bad. The results are uncertainty
and cynicism, and the loss of both the way and the will to improve
our society.
V.

THE

BOOK'S PURPOSE: DOES ITS METHOD SERVE ITS GOAL?

One can assume, I think, that Ms. Law and the other participants in the Health Law Project had as their long range objective
the improvement of health care in the United States. They feel
that the present system serves that purpose poorly and that it
must be radically changed to bring good care to the community.
With their long range goal, no one can quarrel. By the same
token, such changes as may be necessary to achieve it should be
made. The book itself is ambivalent as to whether such necessary
changes include the abolition of Blue Cross, or the substitution
for it of some other agency, governmental or private. It states,
"[i]t is possible that the present Blue Cross organization could
be transformed, so that the resource it represents could be used
to administer a national health program primarily responsive to
the needs of consumers of health services rather than to the research and professional needs of providers." ' However, it expresses doubt that "Blue Cross is interested in reforming itself in
response to consumer discontent" or "that Blue Cross will move
toward greater consumer control and accountability in the ab-

sence of hard and specific requirements to do

So. ''120

The book's emphasis on "hard and specific requirements"
are of course keyed to its concern for the administration of a
national health program. It is likely that a national health insur119. Pp. 158-59.
120. P. 159. Contra, 1972 Hearings, supra note 82, at 386. "Blue Cross is clearly on
the move toward greater consumer control and participation."
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ance bill will pass in the near future, and now is a crucial time
for designing its administration to provide the most effective
health care for each dollar spent.
I certainly would join in the hope that any national health
insurance program would bring as much (or preferably more)
financial protection and sense of security against the inroads of
ill health for the majority of the population as Medicare did for
the aged. I would also hope that it would be designed with the
lessons learned from Medicare, such as the inflationary effects of
open-ended cost reimbursement, in mind. The significant questions are, what design gives the most promise of effective delivery
and what entity or entities should participate?
In her censure of the present system Ms. Law focuses primarily on the Blue Cross Plans and the hospitals. Other candidates
for future administative responsibility, however, are not spared
her criticism. She comments acidly upon state regulatory authorities,1 2' the Social Security Administration, 22 the Civil Service
Commission,'1 Congress,' 24 and even labor.' 2' No one organization
can be trusted for, to revert to the theme she expressed at page 2
of the book, "any organization or bureaucracy would attempt to
maximize institutional autonomy and stability, particularly financial stability." As Juvenal said 1900 years ago "sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"' 21 The best way to "guard the guardians" is
to design a system where checks and balances improve rather
than impede performance, where the scrutiny and critique of such
performance is likely to be serious rather than self-serving and
where the interests of the patient, the provider and third-party
payor run as much as possible in concert.
This certainly does not recommend a single, monolithic,
governmental system of administration. Government is just as
vulnerable as any other organization, to use the book's own terminology, to succumb to the temptations of "parochial professional
prestige,' 1 27 to cater to "political influence"' 2 and to itself gener121. Pp. 2, 4, 13, 15, 17, 18, 23, 29, 92, 114.
122. Pp 23, 49, 91, 114.
123. Pp. 51, 53-58, 114. At page 114 Ms. Law asserts that "[tihere are no good
models."
124. Pp. 2, 34, 40-41, 92.
125. Pp. 29-30.
126. JuvENAL, Satire VI, line 347.
127. P. 106. See e.g., the enormous per diem costs and low occupancy at Downstate
Medical Center in Brooklyn, New York. In 1968, its cost per patient day was $200.06, far
higher than any other hospital in the area.
128. P. 29. See the track record of the Veterans Administration Hospitals. Media
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ate situations where "[p]recise measurement of the fair costs of
the services was impossible because of the unwillingness or inability of hospitals to make available actual costs of service and because of the lack of uniformity in hospital accounting."' 29
This does not mean that an all-voluntary non-governmental
system is a panacea, but only that whatever system is chosen
must be designed to recognize and guard against the natural and
all too easily rationalized tendency of individuals and organizations to give pride of place to their own participation and performance. The best milieu for minimizing the evils of self-esteem
is one where government carefully monitors and compares for
effectivenss the performance of independent voluntary agencies
in carrying out coverage, benefit administration, and cost control
functions under programs which encourage the most costeffective performance on the part of the actual providers of care.
I am not going to try to outline here such a system or its
proper programs. I would suggest, however, that whatever system
is chosen has a better chance of working if there is mutual respect
and courtesy among the participants as well as reciprocal analysis
and criticism. Intemperate and inaccurate tirades foster neither
the independent judgment nor the realistic cost-effective approach which are necessary to run even the smallest health care
facility. Hatchet jobs do not engender in the victim much appetite to analyze and be analyzed in that dispassionate detail which
is necessary to weigh all of the complicated factors involved in
most health care financing decisions.
The tasks to which Blue Cross: What Went Wrong? could
better have addressed itself are the very real problems of organizational design; incentives to correlate provider predilections to
patient needs; adjustment (within an incentive framework) of
institutions to their changing communitites and responsibilities;
use and availability of hospital beds and other health care resources and how patient attitude and provider attitude can best
interact beneficially rather than detrimentally. These are the
areas of need to which Ms. Law and the rest of us should be
materials illustrating the recent public uproar over inadequate facilities in V.A. hospitals
are on file in the offices of the Hofstra Law Review.
129. P. 59. For the 15 years in which New York's Blue Cross has been auditing its
member hospitals, the Municipal Hospital System of New York City has been unable to
submit certified cost reports susceptible to meaningful verification through audit in the
same fashion as Blue Cross has demanded of and received from the non-governmental
hospitals in the greater New York area.
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devoting our attention, rather than spending time in casting
blame broadcast or in refuting the treatises in which such indiscriminate censure is published.
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